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FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
FOR THE INTERNET

DAWN C. NUNZIATO*
INTRODUCTION

In May 2014, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
on the ropes from two adverse D.C. Circuit decisions,' proposed the
latest in a series of regulations of broadband providers - the entities that
serve as the gatekeepers for all content, applications, and services on the
Internet. 2 While in recent years the FCC has sought to regulate
broadband providers to impose on them the duty not to discriminate
against any of the traffic flowing through their pipes, in these latest
Proposed Rules - in response to the recent D.C. Circuit decision Verizon
v. FCC3 - the FCC has sought to enable broadband providers to
discriminate in favor of or against certain content.
These latest
Proposed Rules are inconsistent with First Amendment values. Over the
past two decades, the Internet has evolved into a vast public forum for
expression and into "the most participatory marketplace of mass speech
that this country - and indeed the world - has yet seen." 5 The FCC

should implement strong net neutrality rules by regulating broadband
providers as common carriers and should prohibit them from

* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am grateful
to Scott Luan for his outstanding research assistance. I am also grateful to the
editors of the First Amendment Law Review for their excellent work on this article.
1. See generally Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast v.
F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2. See generally Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (proposed July 1, 2014) [hereinafter
"NPRM"].
3. 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
4. See NPRM, supra note 2, at 37,449.
5. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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discriminating in favor of or against any legal content. Doing so would
not violate broadband providers' First Amendment rights. Rather, it is the
absence of strong net neutrality regulations that threatens our preeminent
First Amendment values: facilitating the uninhibited, robust, and wideopen marketplace of ideas; fostering the public debate and deliberation
essential for the task of democratic self-government; and, in the process,
protecting speech that is unpopular, disfavored, and less well-funded.

I. HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATION OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS

In the passage and subsequent interpretation of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 6 a central issue confronting
policymakers and courts was how, if at all, access and transmission
services by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be regulated. If
regulated as "telecommunications services" 7 under Title II of the
Telecommunications Act, then such providers would be subject to
common carriage regulations prohibiting them, among other things, from
discriminating against any type of legal content, applications, or
services. 8 If regulated instead as "information services," 9 then such
providers would not be subject to common carriage obligations.' 0 Prior
to 2002, ISPs were generally narrowband or dialup and were regulated as
"telecommunications services" under Title II of the Telecommunications
Act and subject to common carriage obligations prohibiting them from
discriminating against content and services - just as telephone services
historically have been regulated. 1 In 1998, the FCC classified Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) services - broadband furnished over telephone
lines - as "telecommunications services" since, the Commission
reasoned, DSL services involved pure transmission technologies and as

6. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(51), 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2013).
8. See Brand X v. F.C.C., 545 U.S. 967, 975-76 (2005).
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(24), 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2013);
BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975-76.
10. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 975.
at 977-78.
11. See id.
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such were subject to Title II regulation. 12 Four years later, however,
when the FCC was called upon to determine whether to classify cable
broadband providers as "telecommunications services" subject to
common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations, the FCC chose to
classify cable broadband providers as "information services" and hence
exempt from common carriage/nondiscrimination requirements. 13 This
action was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
its Brand X decision in 2005. 14 That same year, the FCC removed
common carriage/nondiscrimination obligations from all other types of
broadband providers as well.1 5 At the time it did so, the FCC issued an
"Internet Policy Statement" that embodied certain net neutrality
principles, although of dubious legal effect and enforceability.'6
Meanwhile, in 2007, Comcast, one of the largest broadband
providers in the U.S., secretly degraded legal peer-to-peer file sharing

traffic.' 7 Comcast's actions, once discovered, prompted the FCC to issue
an order censuring Comcast for violating the FCC's 2005 Internet Policy
Statement, which provided in part that "consumers are entitled to access
the lawful Internet content of their choice .... [and] to run applications
and use services of their choice."'' 8 In Comcast v. FCC,the D.C. Circuit,
in reviewing the FCC's censure of Comcast, held in 2010 that the FCC

12. See Memorandum Op. & Order, & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
FCC Red. 24,011, 24,014, 24,029-30 (1998).
13. See Declaratory Ruling & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C. Red.
4798, 4823-24 (2002).
14. BrandX,545 U.S. at 1001-02.
15. See, e.g., Report & Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.
Red. 14,853, 14,862 (2005); Declaratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C. Red. 5901, 5901-02
(2007); Memorandum Op. & Order, 21 F.C.C. Red. 13,281, 13,281 (2006).
16. Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C. Rcd. 14,986, 14,988 (2005) (asserting that, in
order "[t]o encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to access the
lawful Internet content of their choice"... run applications and use services of their
choice" ... "connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network"...
[and] "competition among network providers, application and service providers, and
content providers").
17. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 13,028, 13,031-32
(2008).
18. Id.at 13,083 (quoting Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C. Red. 14,986, 14,988
(2005).
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lacked authority to enforce its Internet Policy Statement.' 9 The court
held that, since the FCC had classified cable ISPs as "information
services" instead of as "telecommunications services," the FCC had
essentially waived its 20jurisdiction over matters involving net neutrality
and net discrimination.
In response to the decision in Comcast v. FCC, the FCC sought
to re-assert its authority to implement and enforce net neutrality
regulations and issued its 2010 Open Internet Order. 2' The FCC's 2010
Open Internet Order claimed authority to impose net neutrality
regulations under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, which
provides that the FCC "shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans" by using "measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market" or "other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment" and that •the FCC22 "shall take
immediate action to accelerate deployment," if necessary. In its 2010
Open Internet Order, the FCC found that broadband providers potentially
face a variety of incentives to reduce the openness of the Internet. 23 The
Commission observed that some broadband providers have an incentive
to block or disadvantage edge providers to benefit their own or affiliated
offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings. 24 The FCC found that
reducing such openness would constitute "barriers to infrastructure
investment," which the net neutrality safeguards in its 2010 Open
Internet Order would remove. 25 The FCC found further that market
discipline alone could not effectively check such behavior, given the
current market power of broadband providers (in which 70% of the U.S.
population 26has only 2 choices, while 20% has one choice, of broadband
providers).

19. Comcast v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
20. See id.
21. See generally Report & Order, 25 FCC Red. 17,905 (2010) [hereinafter
"Open Internet Order"].
22. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a); Open Internet Order,supra note 22, at 17,972.
23. Open Internet Order,supra note 22, at 17,915-22.
24. Id. at 17,915-19.
25. Id. at 17,968 (internal citation omitted).
26. Id. at 17,923.
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Accordingly, in its 2010 Open Internet Order, the FCC set forth
the following mandates for broadband providers: (1) "Fixed broadband
providers" (cable, DSL) were subject to a no blocking rule and a no
unreasonable discrimination rule, as well as a rule of transparency in
network management. The no blocking rule prohibited fixed broadband
providers from blocking any lawful content, applications, or services.
The no unreasonable discrimination rule prohibited them from engaging
in unreasonable discrimination in handling network traffic.
The
transparency rule required them to publicly disclose accurate information
regarding their network management practices, performance, and
commercial terms of service.27 (2) "Mobile broadband providers" were
subject to a narrower no blocking rule and a rule of transparency in
network management, and they were not subject to a no unreasonable
discrimination rule. The no blocking rule for mobile broadband providers
only prohibited them from blocking access to lawful websites or
applications that compete with their own voice or video telephony
services. The transparency rule required them (like fixed broadband
providers) to publicly disclose accurate information regarding their
network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of
1 28
service.
Broadband provider Verizon challenged the FCC's 2010 Open
Internet Order, claiming inter aliathat the FCC was without authority to
enact such rules, that the FCC's asserted jurisdiction under Section 706
of the Telecommunications Act was invalid, and that the FCC gave up its
authority to enact such regulation when it classified broadband providers
as "information
services" back in 2002 instead of as
"telecommunications
services"
subject
to
common
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations. 29 Verizon also claimed that the
2010 Open Internet Order violated broadband providers' First
Amendment rights. It argued that the First Amendment protects those
who transmit the speech of others and who exercise editorial discretion
in selecting which speech to transmit. Verizon claimed that although
27. Id. at 17,906.
28. Id.
29. Notice of Multicircuit Petitions for Review, Pet. for Rev. of FCC's In the
Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191; Broadband Industry
Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order. 25 FCC Rcd 17,905 (2010),
MDL No.
, DC/I: 11 -ca-01356, (J.P.M.L., October 5, 2011).
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broadband providers generally allow all content to be transmitted, they
nonetheless possess the editorial discretion not to do so. Because the
2010 Open Internet Order stripped providers of control over which
speech they transmit and how they transmit it, and compelled the
carriage of others' speech on a nondiscriminatory basis, Verizon argued,
the order violates providers' First Amendment rights. 30
In January 2014, the D.C. Circuit struck down portions of the
FCC's 2010 Open Internet Order. 3' It determined that the no blocking
rule and the no unreasonable discrimination rules were invalid, while the
32
transparency rules were valid. The court determined that the FCC did
not have the authority to impose the no blocking or no unreasonable
discrimination rules on broadband providers without classifying them as
telecommunications services subject to common carriage obligations
under Title II of the Telecommunications Act. 33 Since the FCC had
previously classified broadband providers as "information services" and
not "telecommunications services," broadband providers could not be
regulated in a manner that essentially subjected them to common carriage
regulation. 34 Therefore, the FCC's 2010 Open Internet Order's no
blocking and nondiscrimination mandates, which could only be applied
to common carriers, could not be applied to broadband providers.35 The
court, however, upheld the transparency rules, which it found were not
36
contingent upon providers being classified as common carriers.
Additionally, the court recognized that Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act vests the FCC with affirmative authority to
enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband
infrastructure. 37 It further agreed with the FCC that broadband providers
represent a threat to Internet openness and could hinder future Internet
38
development without rules similar to those in the Open Internet Order.

30. See id. at 26.
31. Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
32. Id.

33. See id. at 650, 657--659.
34. See id. at 655.
35. See id. at 658-59.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 628.

38. Id. at 645-46.
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The court then suggested changes to the FCC's regulations that would
render them more likely to be upheld.39

II. THE FCC'S MAY 2014 PROPOSED RULES
On May 15, 2014, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in an effort to regulate broadband providers in a manner that
40
would be upheld by the courts. In doing so, the Commission sought to
adhere closely to the guidance provided by the D.C. Circuit in its
decisions striking down the FCC's earlier efforts. These Proposed Rules
include: (1) a strengthened Transparency Rule, (2) a No Blocking Rule,
and (3) a No Commercially Unreasonable Practices Rule. (1) The
strengthened Transparency Rule requires broadband providers to
publicly disclose accurate information regarding their network
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of service. 4'
(2) The No Blocking Rule prohibits (a) fixed broadband providers from
outright blocking lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful
devices, subject to reasonable network management and (b) mobile
broadband providers from blocking access to lawful websites and from
blocking applications that compete with the provider's voice or video
42
telephony services, both subject to reasonable network management.
This No Blocking Rule is similar to the 2010 Open Internet Order but
uses a different legal rationale. (3) The No Commercially Unreasonable
Practices Rule, in lieu of the earlier Non-Discrimination Rule enables
broadband providers to negotiate with edge providers to allow • them
to
43
enter into paid prioritization deals for content, apps, and services. This
Rule applies only to fixed broadband providers and prohibits them from
engaging in commercially unreasonable practices (with the proviso that
reasonable network management shall not constitute a commercially

39.
40.
Internet,
rules).
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 656-58.
See NPRM, supra note 3, at 37,448; Protecting & Promoting the Open
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561 (2014) (releasing the
NPRM, supra note 3, at 37,456-59.
Id. at 37,460-63.
Id. at 37,463-67.
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• 44

unreasonable practice). Under this Rule (which relies upon Section 706
as its jurisdictional authority 45), broadband providers would be prohibited
from engaging in "commercially unreasonable" practices, as opposed to
being prohibited from engaging in "unreasonable discrimination," as
they were under the 2010 Open Internet Order. 46 The FCC has indicated
that it would determine what constitutes a commercially unreasonable
practice on a case-by-case basis, relying on a "totality of the
circumstances" test. 47 The D.C. Circuit has indicated that the
"commercial reasonableness" standard provides sufficient flexibility for
providers to negotiate deals - including pay-for-priority deals - on
individualized terms and therefore was not equivalent to a common
carriage regime. 4 Thus, the proposed No Commercially Unreasonable
Practices Rule governing broadband providers would allow broadband
providers to engage in individualized negotiations with edge providers
- including content providers - through which broadband providers
would be able to prioritize certain content and disfavor other content,
creating "fast lanes" for prioritized content and "slow lanes" for all other
content. Allowing for prioritization of some content and disfavoring
other content is inconsistent with our preeminent First Amendment
values, as I explain below.
In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC also seeks
comments on whether the imposition of strong net neutrality rules that
prohibit broadband providers from discriminating against or blocking
legal content would violate broadband providers' First Amendment
rights.
Strong net neutrality rules would not violate the First
Amendment rights of broadband providers, as I discuss below. Rather, it
is the absence of strong net neutrality regulations that threatens our
preeminent First Amendment values.

44. Id. at 37,464.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 37,463-64.
47. See NPRM supra note 3, at 37,466.
48. Cellco P'ship v. F.C.C., 700 F.3d 534, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding
data roaming order).
49. See NPRM supra note 2, at 37,469.
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III. THE FCC'S PROPOSED RULES FAIL TO PROTECT OUR PREEMINENT
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES ON THE INTERNET

A. FirstAmendment Values: Enablingthe Marketplace of Ideas,

FacilitatingDemocratic Self-Government, and Protecting
DisfavoredSpeech
Since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's exposition of the
philosophical basis of the First Amendment in Abrams v. United States
and other early twentieth century decisions, the Supreme Court's free
speech jurisprudence has increasingly been grounded in protection for
the open marketplace for speech -- a marketplace that allows for the free
trade in ideas -- no matter how unpopular the speakers or the speech and
regardless of whether the speaker has secured the support of the powers
that be or is speaking in opposition to such powers.' ° Through its First
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has ensured that the
marketplace of ideas is not distorted as a result of discrimination for or

against particular speakers, subjects, viewpoints, or content. The Court
has been quick to strike down regulations that favor or disfavor the
speech of a particular speaker or subject, as well as regulations that favor
or disfavor particular viewpoints or content, because such regulations
would distort the marketplace of ideas. Although critics have argued that
a real marketplace of ideas has never truly existed in real space because
of the dominance of certain speakers in mass media and because of high
barriers to entry in real space forums for expression,5" in the context of
the Internet, these criticisms hold far less traction. Rather, the Internet
has the true potential to be the paradigm marketplace of ideas.

50. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas... the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution."). See e.g., Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
51. See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974) (describing
critics' argument that "[the] First Amendment interest of the public in being
informed is . . . in peril because the 'marketplace of ideas' is today a monopoly
controlled by the owners of the market.")
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At the same time that it has adopted the Holmesian marketplace
of ideas as a foundational First Amendment organizing principle, the
Supreme Court has also embraced a democratic self-governance model
of the First Amendment, embracing the theory that free speech is
necessary because open discussion and debate on matters affecting the
public is essential to our task of democratic self-government. As
Alexander Meiklejohn explained, in order for the people to have the
opportunity of becoming an informed electorate, they need to be able to
discuss and debate freely in a manner that is "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" on matters of public and societal importance and to access
52
the speech of others on such subjects. In Meiklejohn's words, "[The
principle of the freedom of speech] is a deduction from the basic
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage." 53 When speech is regulated in such a way that favors or
disfavors certain speakers or viewpoints, this "[mutilates] the thinking
process of the community" by tipping the scale in favor of one side of the
debate and disserves these goals of democratic self-government.54 The
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of striking down
regulations that discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint because
such regulations distort the public debate. To facilitate the First
Amendment value of enabling democratic self-government, the Court
has been careful to protect the public's access to speech from a
multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic sources, free from discrimination
on the basis of content, viewpoint, speaker, or subject matter. 55 As the
Court explained in Turner Broadcast Systems v. FCC56 , "assuring that
the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a
52. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 26-27 (1948). See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270

(1964) (noting that there is "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.").
53. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 52, at 26-27.
54. Id.
55. Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
56. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central
to the First Amendment., 57 Indeed, it has long been a basic tenet of
national communications policy that "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public."' 58 The Court in particular has looked with
skepticism on the wielding of private power exercised by gatekeepers of
speech that would limit the public's access to a multiplicity of sources of
information, observing that, "the potential for abuse of this private power
over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked." '9
Indeed, in cases involving gatekeeper control by cable network
operators, the Court has recognized the importance for First Amendment
purposes of the government's "taking steps to ensure that private interests
[do] not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.",60 And, just as
cable network operators exercise gatekeeper power in the television
market, so too do broadband providers exercise gatekeeper power over
Internet access and transmission for anyone wishing to reach their
subscribers, as the D.C. Circuit recently recognized. 6' Such gatekeeper
power should also be held in check when it threatens the public's access
to information from diverse and antagonistic sources,
access which is
62
necessary to facilitate democratic self-government.
Finally, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the protection of
unpopular, disfavored, or less well-funded speech against discrimination
is a preeminent First Amendment value, and one that is integral to both
facilitating the marketplace of ideas and enabling the speech necessary
for democratic self-government. The marketplace model itself ensures
that all speech, even speech that we "loathe," should have its chance in

57. Id. at 663.
58. Id. at 663 (internal quotations omitted).
59. Id. at 657.

60. Id
61. Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
62. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (stating that "a
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.").
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The Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has
the marketplace.
emphasized the importance of protecting unpopular speech against the
popular will when the powers that be act to censor, financially burden, or
discriminate against unpopular speech. First Amendment values require
that speech not be subject to discriminatory treatment simply because
"the overwhelming majority of people might find [it] distasteful or
discomforting."' 64 Rather, the unpopularity of the speech is the very
reason "for according it constitutional protection. 65 As Justice Anthony
Kennedy has explained, "the creation of standards and adherence to
them, even when it means affording protection to speech unpopular or
distasteful, is the central achievement of our First Amendment
Further, as the Court has explained, a law "is
jurisprudence.
a
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes 67
speech.,
their
of
content
the
of
because
speakers
financial burden on
This First Amendment value according protection to unpopular or
disfavored speech extends to the protection of less well-funded speech.
The Supreme Court's public forum jurisprudence in particular has
emphasized the importance of allowing for meaningful avenues of
communication for poorly funded causes and speakers, who may not
of their message if not for
have the means of paying for the expression 68
the availability of public forums for speech. Thus, a preeminent First
,,66

63. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.... [W]e should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.").
64. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (citations omitted).
65. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crimes Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (citations omitted).
66. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
784 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
67. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115.
68. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)
(protecting unpopular group's access to public forum).
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Amendment value is the protection of unpopular, disfavored, and less
well-funded speech against financial or other types of discrimination and the provision of meaningful forums for expression for such speech.

B. The Internet Fulfills the FirstAmendment's Promise of Enabling
Meaningful Forumsfor FreeExpression
The Internet today is as much a public forum for expression as
any other medium ever known or invented. Courts have recognized this,
characterizing the Internet as "the most participatory marketplace of
69
mass speech that this country - and indeed the world - has yet seen."
The Supreme Court has recognized that the fnternet is a forum where any
speaker "can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than
it could from any soapbox. ' , 70 As such, the Internet comes closer to
delivering on the First Amendment's promise of enabling meaningful
forums for free expression than any other space or forum ever known or
invented.
Real space forums for expression are imperfect but the Internet
isn't - yet. While some mediums for expression in real space have
suffered from high barriers to entry and control by gatekeepers (like
cable and broadcast) or by dominance by a handful of well-funded
speakers (like major newspapers), the Internet has come very close to
fulfilling the First Amendment's promise of being a truly democratic,
open, and accessible medium of expression - one that hasn't allowed for
discrimination on the basis of content, viewpoint, or speaker identity.
Access to the Internet until now has operated much like access to a
public forum for expression, like the ability enjoyed by every citizen to
speak freely in a public park or on a public street or sidewalk - without
fear of discrimination on the basis of the content or viewpoint of her
speech or on the basis of her identity. The courts, Congress, and even
the FCC in the past have worked to advance a vision and a reality of the
Internet that directly embodies our First Amendment values - an open
Internet that fosters a vast, democratic marketplace for speech with low

69. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996),) affd, 521 U.S.
844 (1997).
70. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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barriers to entry; a vibrant Internet that is "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen"; and an nondiscriminatory Internet that protects and facilitates
speech that is disfavored, unpopular, or less well-funded.7'

C. The FCC'sProposedRules, by Allowing BroadbandProviders to
DiscriminateAgainst Content, Are Inconsistent With First
Amendment Values
The FCC's proposed regulation of the Internet to allow the
Internet's gatekeepers to favor some content-either their own or
affiliated content, or third party content upon payment of a fee-and to
disfavor other content is inconsistent with our preeminent First
Amendment values.7 2
Through the no-commercially-unreasonable-practices provision,
the Proposed Rules allow for broadband providers to prioritize some
content (to provide fast lane treatment for some content over others),
including prioritization of the broadband provider's own and affiliated73
content and the paid prioritization of other edge providers' content.
Although the Proposed Rules prohibit outright blocking (censorship) of
content,74 the Rules allow for prioritization of some content (fast lane
treatment) and corresponding degradation of other content (slow lane
treatment). 75 Even though such treatment is not outright censorship, it is
nonetheless inconsistent with First Amendment values. Degradation of
transmission of content (slow lane treatment), especially latencysensitive content like video, is the practical equivalent of blocking or
censoring such content for Internet users. The average Internet user is
intolerant of even miniscule delays in the transmission of content.
71. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding
the First Amendment represents a national commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate).
72. See generally NPRM supra note 2, at 37,447.
73. See id. at 37,464, 37,480 (stating that the "commercially reasonable"
requirement "could permit broadband providers to serve customers and carry traffic
on an individually negotiated basis, 'without having to hold themselves out to serve
all comers indiscriminately on the same or standardized terms,' so long as such
conduct is commercially reasonable.").
74. Id. at 37,460-61.
75. Id. at 37,480.
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Internet users are quick to click away if anything takes too long, even by
76
fractions of a second. Four out of five Internet users will click away if a
video stalls while loading. 77 Thus, slow lane treatment for Internet
content is the practical equivalent of blocking such content, given the
realities of Internet users' experience.
Further, the Proposed Rules do not even require that broadband
providers offer the same prioritization arrangements to all comers, as
does the United States Postal Service or carriers like UPS, which offer
fast lanes to any and all who can afford to pay. 78 Allowing broadband
providers the discretion to pick and choose favorites for preferential fast
lane treatment will operate to disadvantage less well-financed,
disfavored, and unpopular content. It will also allow for and result in
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint and content by broadband
providers, which is inconsistent with First Amendment values.
Allowing for Internet gatekeepers to prioritize some content and
disfavor other content is inimical to the marketplace of ideas because
such prioritization results in the skewing and distortion of the
marketplace of ideas. For example, the Proposed Rules would permit
Verizon to allow for paid prioritization/fast lane treatment for Fox News
video content, while not according paid prioritization/fast lane treatment
for Al Jazeera News video content, resulting in discrimination on the
basis of content or viewpoint and skewing the marketplace of ideas.
Burdening speech or discriminating against speech within a forum like
the Internet because of the speech's unpopularity is inconsistent with our
First Amendment values.7 9 The Supreme Court has held that "speech
cannot be ...burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
80

[because of its unpopularity]."

76. Urs Hoelzle, The Google Gospel of Speed, THINK QUARTERLY (January
2012),
https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/articles/the-google-gospel-of-speed-urshoelzle.html (last visited January 22, 2015).
77. Don Reisinger, Most People Say No to Slow Online Video, (December 11,
2009 12:53 PM PST), http://www.cnet.com/news/most-people-say-no-to-slowonline-video/.
78. See NPRM supra note 2, at 37,461 (stating that "we must permit providers
to 'adapt... to individualized circumstances without having to hold themselves out
to serve all comers indiscriminately on the same or standardized terms."').
79. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1219 ("[Public] speech cannot be
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.").
80. Forsyth Cnty.,Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992).
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Further, under the Proposed Rules, broadband providers would
be allowed to charge a premium for fast lane service that less wellfinanced content providers, including noncommercial and nonprofit
organizations, will not be able to afford. s1 For example, Verizon may
choose to allow for paid prioritization for CBS's video content while
NPR may not be able to afford to pay the premium Verizon requires for
paid prioritization. Allowing for fast lane treatment of some content
while relegating other content to slow lane treatment is also inconsistent
with the notion of equal treatment of speakers within a public forum for
expression. Such a regime would be inconsistent with the First
Amendment value of protecting unpopular, disfavored, or less wellfunded speech-the "central achievement of our First Amendment
jurisprudence." 82 In short, under the Proposed Rules, broadband
providers have the incentive to engage in precisely the sort of contentbased, viewpoint-based, and subject-matter based regulations of speech
that are antithetical to our pre-eminent First Amendment values.
Finally, the Proposed Rules' "minimum level of access"
requirement is not sufficient to protect First Amendment values on the
Internet. 83 The reason is more fundamental than the concerns about
administrability1 4 and usability 85 that some critics have asserted. The

81. NPRM supra note 2, at 37,480.
82. See supra text and quotation accompanying note 62.
83. The Proposed Rules define blocking as "[t]he failure of a broadband
Internet access service to provide an edge provider with a minimum level of access
that is sufficiently robust, fast, and dynamic for effective use by end users and edge
providers." See § 8.11 (a).
84. See, e.g., Comments of Vimeo, LLC, In the Matter of Protecting and
Promoting the Open Internet, 59 Fed. Reg. 37, 448 (July 15, 2014) (No. 14-28) at 10
("[M]easuring minimum performance in terms of a broadband provider's 'best
efforts' or an 'objective, evolving reasonable person standard' will complicate
enforcement. These types of inquiries may require expert evidence and/or consumer
surveys. As a result, filing a regulatory complaint would be a time and resource
intensive affair that would provide little certainty of outcome. This process is not
well suited to an industry that is characterized by constant, rapid, and unpredictable
changes in user behavior.") (citation omitted).
85. Id.at 11 ("These findings [on rates of abandonment based on user
expectations of speed] have significant implications for a two-tiered Internet. Merely
having a 'fast lane' for paid traffic will alter consumers' perception of the standard
for speed. When consumers become accustomed to receiving video at a certain
delivery rate, that rate will become the defacto standard and everything else will be
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more fundamental problem is that any concept of threshold (e.g.,
minimum level) is problematic because unpopular, disfavored, or less
well-funded speech will likely suffer from the disparity necessarily
introduced by the threshold concept.
Providers will inevitably
maintain-and profit from-the disparity in performance, such that the
fast(er) lane, which exceeds the minimum level of access, will remain
meaningful as a relative concept. From an economic perspective, the
disparity allows for competition and financial gain. From a First
Amendment perspective, the disparity risks discrimination. History
urges caution regarding disparities in matters of fundamental rights like
free speech interests,
suggests that from disparity it is but a short
.... and 86
distance to discrimination. A separate and unequal slow lane should
justifiably raise concerns about First Amendment (and other
constitutional) values on the Internet.

D. If Unregulated,BroadbandProviders Will Likely Discriminate
Against Some Content andIn Favor of Other Content
The possibility that broadband providers, if given the
opportunity, will discriminate against expression on the basis of its
viewpoint or content is not merely theoretical. Similar types of
discrimination have already occurred in related contexts. Consider the
actions of Verizon Wireless in restricting the ability of a pro-choice
organization to transmit SMS messages. In 2007, Verizon Wireless
refused to allow NARAL Pro-Choice America to transmit such messages
to NARAL's own members. Asserting its authority to block messages
from any group that seeks to "distribute content that, in [Verizon's]
perceived as substandard. Consumers are unlikely to know (or care) about why a
particular video takes two seconds to load or is constantly rebuffering, and will
abandon those edge providers that they perceive as providing a slower, and thus less
enjoyable, experience.").
86. Advocates of de-regulation (i.e., opponents of net neutrality) point to a
different history-the economic history of failed regulatory attempts at preventing
anti-competitive behavior by vertically integrated firms that enjoy market power at
one level of the vertical chain of production. See, e.g., Bruce M. Owen, The Net
Neutrality Debate: Twenty Five Years after United States v. AT&T and 120 Years
after the Act to Regulate Commerce, (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research,
Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 336, 2007).
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discretion, may be seen as controversial or unsavory to any of our
users," Verizon initially refused to facilitate the transmission of such
messages to certain Verizon customers---even when those users had
In that case,
expressly signed up to receive NARAL's messages.
Verizon ultimately bowed to public pressure (after it was subject to
criticism in a front page article in the New York Times) and reversed
course, all the while maintaining that it enjoyed the discretion to
determine in the future which text messages to facilitate and which to
prohibit. 87 Although the mainstream media in that case imposed a
sufficient check on Verizon Wireless's content and viewpoint
discrimination, the fact remains that wireless and broadband providers
have an incentive to discriminate against content that is disfavored,
poorly funded, or unpopular.
T-Mobile's censorship of SMS messages connected to legal
medical marijuana services provides a further example of discrimination
against such controversial or unpopular content. In September 2010, TMobile blocked all messages going to or coming from EZ Texting, a
marketing company that enables its clients to provide short code text
messaging. T-Mobile did so because EZ Texting had contracted with the
Legal Marijuana Dispensary, a web service that provides information
regarding access to medical marijuana in states where it is legal. TMobile found Legal Marijuana Dispensary content to be "objectionable"
and sought to block all text messages to or from intermediary EZ Texting
- regardless of whether the messages involved the Legal Marijuana
Dispensary - even after EZ Texting agreed to drop Legal Marijuana
Dispensary as a client. In EZ Texting's lawsuit, T-Mobile asserted that it
had the discretion to refuse to facilitate content of which it did not
88
approve.

87. See Adam Liptak, In Reversal, Verizon Says It Will Allow Group's Texts,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2007), at A20; see also Comments of March 14, 2008 of TMobile, Inc. at 6-7, in the Matter of Public Knowledge et al. for a Declaratory
Ruling Stating that Text Messages and Short Codes are Title 1IServices or are Title I
Services Subject to Section 202 Nondiscrimination Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. 4,866 (Jan.
28, 2008).
88. See Edward Moyer, T-Mobile Sued for Allegedly Blocking Pot-Related
Texting, CNET NEWS, Sept. 18, 2010, available at http://news.cnet.com/830113578_3-20016908-38.html.
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Discrimination on the basis of content, viewpoint, subject matter,
or speaker identity within a public forum like the Internet by those who
hold the reins of power is inconsistent with First Amendment values.
Because of the importance of protecting an open marketplace of ideas
and enabling public discussion and debate on matters of public
importance, allowing broadband providers to enter into paid
prioritization deals with favored content providers and degrading the
transmission of disfavored, poorly funded, or unpopular content will not
adequately protect our preeminent First Amendment values. To accord
meaningful protection for such values, broadband providers-as
gatekeepers responsible for the free flow of information on "the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and indeed
the world-has yet seen" 89-should be subject to strong net neutrality
rules that prohibit discrimination in favor of or against any legal content.

E. The FCCShould Regulate BroadbandProviders as Common Carriers
The FCC should correct the mistake it made in 2002 when it
declined to classify broadband providers as "telecommunications
services" subject to common carriage obligations under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. As President Obama has recently
argued, 90 the FCC should reclassify broadband providers as
telecommunications services subject to common carriage obligations to
remedy once and for all the problems that it wrought in 2002 by
declining to so regulate broadband providers.
The common carriage doctrine imposes obligations on private
speech conduits to facilitate the expression of others and prohibits these
conduits from exercising the discretion to determine which
communications to facilitate and which to censor. Since the beginning of
the modem communications era in the 1930s, the FCC has imposed
obligations on providers of interstate communications services (like
telephone and telegraph companies) to facilitate the transmission of all

89. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
90. President Barack Obama, Net Neutrality: President Obama's Plan for a
Free
and
Open
Internet
(Nov.
10,
2014),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality.
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legal content. The United States Postal Service has also been regulated
as a common carrier that is required to facilitate the transmission of all
legal content and is prohibited from discriminating against such
content.9 1 As Ithiel de Sola Pool explains:
[T]he law of common carriage protects ordinary
citizens in their right to communicate. . . .[This
doctrine] rests on the . . . assumption that, in the

absence of regulation, the carrier will have enough
monopoly power to deny citizens the right to
communicate. The rules against discrimination are
designed to ensure access to the means of
communication ....

[T]his .

.

. element of civil
9

liberty is central to [the law of common carriage]. 2
The common carriage status of communications providers
benefits members of the public by granting them access to
communications conduits under a nondiscrimination principle. As
Jerome Barron explains, individuals who rely on common carriers to
facilitate their communications "benefit from the democratic
egalitarianism which characterizes the non-discriminatory
access
93
principle associated with common carrier law.,
The common carriage doctrine in the United States has its roots
in the early English law of common carriage, 94 under which private
entities that served the public in the performance of important public
functions were charged with certain obligations. At English common
law, the common carriage doctrine was a vehicle for imposing
obligations on private entities that performed important functions for the
95
benefit of the public, similar to those assumed by the government itself.
By imposing obligations on certain private entities to facilitate the
transport and, ultimately, the communications of others, the common

91. See, e.g.,
(1983).
92. Id. at 106.

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES AND FREEDOM

75-107

93. Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, The Common CarrierModel, and The First
Amendment - The "Dial-A-Porn" Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
371, 383 (1993).
94.
See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet
Interconnection,54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 251-52 (2002).

95. Id.
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carriage doctrine rejected the principle that private entities may regulate
transportation and communication however they choose, with their
conduct held in check by the market only.
In the mid-1880s, Congress began to regulate American
telegraph companies in a manner akin to common carriers. Even though
telegraph companies (like broadband provides today) did not enjoy
monopoly power within their market, Congress conditioned certain
valuable privileges for telegraph companies on their agreement to be
subject to common carriage obligations. 96 In 1893, the Supreme Court
ruled that, like common carriers, telegraph companies were required to
provide service without discrimination. 97 Two decades later, in the
Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, Congress extended common carrier
obligations to a host of early telecommunications
providers, including
S 98
telegraph, telephone, and cable providers.
Congress overhauled the regulation of telecommunications
providers in the Communications Act of 1934,99 which charged the
newly-created Federal Communications Commission with regulatory
authority over telecommunications providers (telegraph and telephone
companies), regardless of whether they enjoyed monopoly power, and
imposed additional common carriage regulations on such providers. 100
Under the 1934 Act, common carriers are charged with the obligation to
serve as transparent conduits for all (legal) content originated by
others.' 0 1 The role of a common carrier, like the telephone company, is
neither to generate content nor to make editorial or qualitative decisions
96. DE SOLA POOL, supra, note 89, at 106.
97. Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1893).

Common carriage

obligations were also imposed on transportation providers. The Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887 imposed affirmative common carriage obligations on railroads,
requiring them to serve the public, to connect their tracks to one another, and
prohibiting them from engaging in price discrimination.
98. Speta, supra note 94, at 261-262.
99. 47 U.S.C. §151 (1934).
100. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936). Under
the Communications Act of 1934, common carriage obligations were imposed upon
companies that were (1) engaged in interstate communication, (2) by wire, (3) by
any entity engaged as a common carrier for hire. The Act's definition of common
carrier looked to "whether the carrier holds itself out indiscriminately to a class of
persons for service," regardless of whether the entity enjoyed monopoly power. 47
U.S.C. §151 (1934).
101. Sable Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).

2014] FIRST AMD. VALUES FOR THE INTERNET

303

regarding which content to carry and which to censor. 02 Common
carriers are prohibited from "mak[ing] individualized decisions, in
particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal,"' 3 and do not enjoy
04
independent First Amendment rights to exercise editorial discretion.
Unlike newspaper publishers, for example, common carriers are not
entitled to engage in editorial discretion to determine which content to
105
The content transmitted by a common
transmit and which to censor.
carrier-unlike that transmitted by a newspaper publisher-is not subject
to editorial control or discretion. 06 As such, common carriers are
distinct from publishers or other editors who enjoy their own First
exercise editorial discretion in their selection and
Amendment rights to
10 7
exclusion of content.
common
century,
the
mid-twentieth
Throughout
carriage/nondiscrimination obligations were applied to traditional
conduits of communication like telephone companies.'0 8 In the early
1970s, the FCC began to consider whether and to what extent to impose
common carriage obligations on computer-assisted processes and
services.109 In a series of "Computer Inquiries," the FCC essentially
created two categories of computer-assisted communications services:
basic services and enhanced services. "0 "Basic" (later,

102. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §151 (1934); Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
103. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry into Video Services.: A
FirstAmendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 106 n. 24 (1991).
107. See, e.g., Barron, supra, note 91, at 377, 389 (explicating the dichotomy
between the publisherfbroadcaster model and the common carrier model).
108. Barron, supra,note 93, at 377, 382-85; Brenner, supra, note 106, at 98.
109. See Amendment of Section 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 of the Commission's
Rules & Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384,
5 (1980).
110. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Notice oflnquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d
11, 8 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1567 (1966); Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision,
77 F.C.C.2d 384, 47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 669 (1980); Amendment of Section
64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and
Order, 104 F.C.C. 958 (1986).
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"telecommunications") services, like telephone and facsimile services,
were those that offered straightforward transmission services, and those
offering such services were regulated as common carriers and made
subject to the requirement that they not discriminate on the basis of
content. "' "Enhanced" (later, "information" services) were those in
which computer processing applications were implemented to act on a
subscriber's information, and providers of such services
•1
12 were exempt
from common carriage/nondiscrimination requirements.
In 1996, in its passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Congress revisited the categorization of services subject to common
carriage regulation that was established under the Computer Inquiries.' 13
Under the 1996 Act, "telecommunications" services were made subject
to common carriage regulation (replacing the category of "basic
services"), while "information services" were exempted from common
carriage regulation (replacing the formerly exempt category of
"enhanced services").' 14 The Act maintained significant common carrier

111. Second Computer Inquiry, FinalDecision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384,

96,

102,

47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 669 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final Decision]; (Basic
service is the offering of"a pure transmission capability over a communications path
that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied
information."). Id. at 98. See also text accompanying notes 5-7.
112. See, e.g., Computer 11Final Decision, 97; Establishment of a Funding
Mechanism for Interstate Operator Servs. For the Deaf, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 6808,
16, 2 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 744 (1996) (An enhanced
service employs "computer processing applications" that: (1) "act on the format,
content, code, protocol or similar aspects of a subscriber's transmitted information";
(2) provide the subscriber "additional, different, or restructured information"; or (3)
"involve subscriber interaction with stored information." Computer I1 Final
Decision, 97); see also text accompanying notes 5-7.
113. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(49), § 102(e)(2), § 301(j), 47
U.S.C. § 152, 153(11) (2013).
114. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(49), 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2013);
Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report and
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418,
2 n.6 (2001) (citing Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Red. 11501,
11516-17, 11520, 11524, paras. 33, 39, 45-46 (1998) ("The Commission has
concluded that Congress sought to maintain the basic/enhanced distinction in its
definition of 'telecommunications services' and 'information services,' and that
,enhanced services' and 'information services' should be interpreted to extend to the
same functions.").
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obligations on providers of "'telecommunications services," while
115
leaving "information services" providers subject to far less regulation.
The Act defined "telecommunications service" as "the offering
of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public

. . .

regardless of

used." 1 6

The FCC has ruled that, despite the changes in
the facilities
nomenclature, the basic distinctions between these two categories remain
the same. The 1996 Act changed the rights and responsibilities of
common carriers by specifying more precisely the obligations that
common carriers must assume.117 While the Act creates a presumption
that telecommunications carriers will be treated as common carriers, it
authorized the FCC to forbear from enforcing any provision of the Act if
the FCC determines that such enforcement is unnecessary to guard
against discrimination, to ensure just and reasonable services, to
safeguard consumers, or to serve the public interest. 8 Title II of the
Communications Act sets forth a complex regulatory regime imposed
upon common carriers, but the essential duty imposed upon common
carriers is the duty not to discriminate in the offering of their services,
and in particular, not to discriminate against certain types of content in
serving as conduits for the transmission of such content.
In the passage and interpretation of the Telecommunications Act,
a central issue confronting policymakers and courts was how, if at all, the
provision of Internet access by cable providers (and the provision of
broadband Internet access more generally) should be regulated. If
regulated as "telecommunications services," then providers of broadband
Internet access would be subject to common carriage regulation
prohibiting them, among other things, from discriminating against any
type of legal content (and requiring them to allow interconnection by
unaffiliated ISPs).119 If regulated instead as providing only "information
115. Id.

116. Communications Act of 1934, § 3(44), (codified as amended 47 U.S.C. §
153 (1991)).
117. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(49), § 102(e)(2), § 301(j), 47
U.S.C. § 152, 153(11) (2013).
118. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S.
967, 975-76 (2005).
119. Id. The Act provides that common carriers must furnish service upon
reasonable request and must establish reasonable charges, practices, classifications,
and regulations regarding service. This section also imposes obligations upon
common carriers to interconnect with the facilities and services of other carriers and
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services," then providers of broadband Internet access would be free of
such common carriage obligations.
In its 2002 "Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities" 1 20 (hereinafter "Declaratory
Ruling"), the FCC concluded that cable modem service was an
"information service" with "no separate offering of telecommunications
service,"' 12 1 the latter of which would have rendered such services subject
to common carriage obligations. The Commission ruled that the
provision of cable broadband service does not contain a separate
telecommunications service because the transmission of the data is "part
122
As an
and parcel" of that service, and is integral to its capabilities.
"information service" with "no separate offering of telecommunications
service," cable operators' provision of broadband Internet access was
exempted from the common carrier regulations of Title II of the
Communications Act. This ruling by the FCC is significant in that it
reverses course on the history of the Commission's regulation of
telecommunications services. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC
formulated and implemented a workable distinction between the
underlying common carrier network, on the one hand, and the services
and information made available over that network, on the other. The
2002 Declaratory Ruling collapsed this crucial distinction and for the
first time permitted network operators to discriminate against the content
they were charged with transmitting over their networks.
The decision by the FCC to exempt cable broadband from
common carriage obligations was challenged by unaffiliated ISPs who
asserted the right to interconnect with cable providers' pipelines and
sought a ruling that cable broadband should be regulated as the provision
of a telecommunications service subject to common carriage obligations.
In a case that former FCC Commissioner Michael Copps described as
involving nothing less than the "future of the Internet," 23 the Supreme

end users, and sets out the terms and conditions under which incumbent carriers
must interconnect with newcomer carriers.
120. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798, 7 (2002).
121. Id.
122. Id. 39.
123. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 996.
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Court in Brand X determined that the FCC enjoyed the discretion to
interpret the Telecommunications Act as it had done in its Declaratory
Ruling to decline to subject cable operators' provision of broadband
Internet access - or the provision of any other type of broadband Internet
access - to nondiscrimination/common carriage obligations. Rather, as
providers of "information services," they are subject to less stringent
regulation under the Act under the FCC's Title I "ancillary authority,"
under which the FCC enjoys the authority to impose requirements that
authority.' 2 4
are "reasonably ancillary to existing Commission Statutory
The Commission found that cable broadband providers offer "a single,
integrated service that enables the subscriber to utilize Internet access
service . . . and to realize the benefits of a comprehensive service

offering,"1 25 and concluded that the integrated service provided was an
component
separate
a
without
service,"
"information
subject to
the
providers
render
would
"telecommunications service" that
common carriage regulation. The FCC grounded its decision, in part, on
the policy judgment that "broadband service should exist in a minimal
that promotes investment and innovation in a
regulatory environment
126
competitive market."'

The Supreme Court's decision to allow the FCC the discretion to
roll back common carriage obligations on cable and other broadband
providers heralded a substantial blow for free speech on the Internet.
After the Brand X decision, the FCC subsequently removed common
carriage regulations from every other type of broadband provider. One
month after the BrandX decision was handed down, the FCC ruled that
DSL, like cable broadband, was also an "information service," and that
access
therefore telephone companies' provision of broadband • Internet
127
•
via DSL would no longer be subject to common carriage requirements.
124. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798 75, 77, 95 (2002), subsequent history omitted.
125. Id. 38.
126. Id.; see BrandX, 545 U.S. at 978 (citations omitted).
127. For transition purposes, the Wireline Broadband Order required that DSL
providers continue to provide existing wireline broadband Internet access
transmission offerings on a grandfathered basis to unaffiliated ISPs for one year after
See Appropriate
the date of the order's publication of September 25, 2005.
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Report
and Order and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 5-6 (2005).
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The FCC subsequently ruled that all other types of broadband are
128
likewise exempt from common carriage/nondiscrimination regulations.
Accordingly, decisions about what speech to censor and what speech to
facilitate were left to the discretion of the companies providing
broadband Internet access.
The FCC's fundamental misstep in removing common carriage,
nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers (later approved
by the Supreme Court in Brand X9 was its determination that cable
operators providing broadband Internet access were not-in whole or in
part-offering "telecommunications services" and were therefore not
subject-- •to129 regulation as common carriers or pure communications
conduits.
The Commission erred by prioritizing the very limited
editorial role of cable broadband providers over the much weightier free
speech interests of members of the public who necessarily rely on
broadband providers to serve as conduits for their expression.
In regulating broadband providers, Congress and the FCC should
be guided by the principle underlying modem communications law that
liberal democracies require a well-informed citizenry, which in turn
requires that citizens enjoy the freedom to communicate and to access
communications conduits on a nondiscriminatory basis. The same
principles that justify regulating telephone and telegraph operators and
the postal service as common carriers subject to nondiscrimination
requirements-in order to "protect ordinary citizens in their right to
communicate" 130-are valid today with regard to Internet
communications.
The recent regulatory state of affairs in the Internet context,
which allows broadband providers to discriminate against whatever
content or applications they choose for whatever reasons they choose, is
inconsistent with the historical progression of according individuals
protection in their freedom to communicate. Broadband providers should
be subject to regulation as "telecommunications services" requiring them
to assume at least the nondiscrimination obligations that historically have
128. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies for
Selective Regulation of information Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 373

(2008).
129. See DAWN C.

NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE

SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE, ch. 6 (2009).
130. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 91, at 106.
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been imposed upon common carriers-the duty to facilitate and transmit
in a nondiscriminatory manner any and all legal content.

F. Strong Net Neutrality Regulation ProhibitingBroadbandProviders
from Blocking or DiscriminatingAgainst Legal Content Would Not
Infringe Providers' FirstAmendment Rights
In its May 2014 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC
requested comment on whether the imposition of strong net neutrality
rules-prohibiting broadband providers from discriminating in favor of
or against legal content-would violate broadband providers' First
Amendment rights.' Such rules would not violate broadband providers'
rights, despite broadband providers' repeated arguments to the contrary,
as I discuss below.
Broadband providers like Verizon have long argued that they
enjoy the First Amendment right to favor or disfavor the Internet content
of their choosing and that nondiscrimination and no-blocking rules
would violate their free speech rights. Even while claiming that they do
not actually discriminate against expression and that they in fact allow
for the free flow of all types of content, they claim that their primary role
for First Amendment purposes is similar to that of a newspaper editorthat of a selector or editor of the Internet's content and as a speaker in
their own right, not as a conduit for the communications of others. They
characterize their role as such to bolster their right to favor or disfavor
the content of their choosing and to shore up their First Amendment
rights under existing precedent. Verizon, for example, claims that its role
in providing broadband access, for First Amendment purposes, is no
different than a newspaper publisher's-an editor or selector of
content.13 The Supreme Court has held that government interference
131. See NPRM supra note 2 159.
132. See Joint Brief for Verizon and MetroPCS at 43, Verizon v. FCC, No. 111355, 2012 WL 9937411, at *43 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (arguing that "[j]ust as a
newspaper is entitled to decide which content to publish and where, broadband
providers may feature some content over others. Although broadband providers
have generally exercised their discretion to allow all content in an undifferentiated
manner, they nevertheless possess discretion that [net neutrality regulations]
preclude them from exercising.").
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with newspaper publishers' discretion, such as by requiring newspapers
to publish content not of their choosing, violates the newspapers' First
Amendment rights. 133 Verizon argues that the imposition of nondiscrimination and no-blocking rules on broadband providers would
present the same First Amendment concerns that regulation of
newspapers has historically created.
Broadband providers' efforts to cast themselves primarily in the
role of speakers or editors in opposing strong net neutrality regulations
misconstrue the realities of broadband Internet access and misinterpret
First Amendment case law and policy. In providing broadband Internet
access, broadband providers function for First Amendment purposes as
conduits for the speech of others, not as speakers or editors in their own
right. Broadband providers' primary function is to serve as a conduit or
pipeline for the speech of others. When we analyze where on the First
Amendment spectrum-pure conduit versus pure editor-broadband
providers fall with respect to their provision of broadband access, the
functions that broadband providers serve place them on the conduit end
not on the editor end. Accordingly, regulation of their conduit function
to protect the free flow of information would not violate providers' First
Amendment rights.
Even assuming that broadband providers enjoy some minimal
First Amendment interest in the conduit functions they perform, strong
net neutrality regulations that prohibit the blocking of and discrimination
against legal content would be analyzed and upheld by courts as contentneutral regulations of speech that survive intermediate scrutiny. In
Turner BroadcastingSystems v. Federal Communications Commission,
cable network operators objected to "must carry" rules imposed by the
FCC that required them to carry certain broadcast programming not of
their choosing and that limited their editorial discretion over the content
that could be provided over their cable channels. The Court specifically
rejected the analogy the cable operators sought to draw between their
First Amendment rights and those of newspaper publishers and held that
the First Amendment editorial rights of the cable network operators were
quite limited.3T The Court distinguished the amount and type of control
that cable network operators exercise over the communications received
133. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
134. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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by their subscribers from the editorial discretion exercised by
newspapers. It held further that, in contrast to a newspaper, a cable
operator enjoys "bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most . . .
programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home" and that
"simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable
speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining
access to programming it chooses to exclude."'135 The Court concluded
that the FCC enjoyed the power, consistent with the First Amendment, to
"ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a
critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and
ideas."' 36
While recognizing that the must carry rules interfered to some
extent with the First Amendment rights of cable network operators, the
Court ultimately held in Turner II that these regulations were justified in
light of the control that cable operators exert over the free flow of
information and ideas. 137 It held that the challenged must carry
regulations survived intermediate scrutiny because they were contentneutral and did not burden more of the cable operators' speech than
necessary to further the government's important interests. 138 In his
concurring opinion in Turner II, Justice Breyer explained that the must
carry regulations served the purpose of advancing the national
communications policy of protecting "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "facilitat[ing]
the public discussion and informed deliberation [that] . . . democratic
139
government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve.'
Breyer concluded that although there were First Amendment interests
"on both sides of the equation," the must carry regulations struck a
reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting consequences
and speech-enhancing consequences for members of
for cable operators
140
the public.
As in Turner II, the imposition of strong net neutrality
regulations on broadband providers prohibiting discrimination in favor of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
Id. at 657.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 1I), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 227.
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or against content and prohibiting the blocking of content would be
scrutinized as content-neutral regulations that would survive intermediate
scrutiny. The free speech interests of members of the public in having
broadband providers serve as neutral conduits for our communications
are even more pressing than in the TurnerH context. Like the regulations
at issue in Turner II, but to an even greater extent, strong net neutrality
regulations advance the substantial government interest of protecting the
public's meaningful access to the free flow of information and ideasincluding meaningful access to disfavored, poorly funded, and unpopular
expression. Even if broadband providers were able to convince a court
that their First Amendment interests were implicated by such
regulation-and they are implicated far less than cable operators'
interests in Turner II, if at all-Turner II would dictate the conclusion
that such interests were outweighed by the countervailing free speech
interests in promoting broad information dissemination, public
discussion, and deliberation. The predominant free speech interests
implicated by strong net neutrality regulations are those of members of
the public in nondiscriminatory access to the expression they seek to
send and receive, not those of the broadband providers in providing
broadband Internet access. The public's free speech interests outweigh
whatever minimal interests might be asserted by broadband providers
net
neutrality
regulation-imposing
and
therefore
strong
nondiscrimination and no-blocking rules on broadband providerswould not violate the First Amendment rights of broadband providers.

IV. CONCLUSION

common
carriage/
When the FCC
first removed
nondiscrimination obligations from broadband providers in 2002, it
long history of regulating
abandoned the United States'
telecommunications providers (like telephone and telegraph providers) to
require them not to discriminate against the content they were charged
with transmitting. The FCC chose instead to entrust the protection of
Internet users' free speech interests to the market-and to a highly
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imperfect market at that 4--one in which most Internet users have no
meaningful choice as to broadband provider. Under the FCC's current
Proposed Rules, broadband providers would be free to prioritize
whatever content they choose and to discriminate against disfavored
content. Given the freedom to do so in the past, intermediaries for
expression have indeed discriminated against content in a variety of
ways-including against social and political expression and other content
that is highly valued within our constitutional scheme. It should come as
no surprise that they would do so. As unregulated market actors, these
speech intermediaries have various incentives to favor some and to
discriminate against other content-including content that is disfavored,
poorly funded, unpopular or otherwise conflicts with their own political,
Allowing broadband providers to
economic, or other interests.
discriminate in this manner is inconsistent with our First Amendment
values. As the Supreme Court explained in Turner, our nation's First
Amendment values require "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources." 142 Regulation of
powerful speech intermediaries, pursuant to our national communications
policy, is essential to "facilitate the public discussion and informed
deliberation, which.., democratic government presupposes and the First
Amendment seeks to achieve .... [A] ssuring that the public has access to

a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the
43
highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.'
To advance First Amendment values in the Internet age, the FCC
should correct once and for all the mistakes it made in 2002 and impose
on broadband providers the nondiscrimination and no-blocking
obligations that historically have been imposed on conduits for
communication. To fulfill the Internet's promise of being "the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and indeed
the world-has yet seen,"' 144 those who serve as powerful gatekeepers for
141. As FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler recently recognized, Americans today
do not have meaningful options for their choice of high-speed broadband provider.
See Grant Gross, FCC's Wheeler: U.S. Needs More High-Speed Broadband
Competition, PC WORLD, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2602723/fccs-wheeler-usneeds-more-highspeed-broadband-competition.html
142. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 663.
143. Turner l,520 U.S. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
144. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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expression on the Internet should be regulated consistent with First
Amendment values to ensure that they act as good stewards within this
marketplace. The Internet should remain free from discrimination,
prioritization, degradation, blocking, or other censorship, consistent with
the First Amendment values that are necessary to facilitate the
marketplace of ideas and the public discussion and informed deliberation
that democratic government requires.
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APPENDIX: THE FCC's PROPOSED RULES

Proposed Rules
Part 8 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as
follows:
PART 8 - PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE OPEN INTERNET
Sec.
8.1
8.3
8.5
8.7
8.9
8.11

§ 8.1

Purpose.
Transparency.
No Blocking.
No Commercially Unreasonable Practices.
Other Laws and Considerations.
Definitions.

Purpose.

The purpose of this Part is to protect and promote the Internet as an open
platform enabling consumer choice, freedom of expression, end-user
control, competition, and the freedom to innovate without permission,
the deployment of advanced
and thereby to encourage
telecommunications capability and remove barriers to infrastructure
investment.
§ 8.3 Transparency.
(a) A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the
network management practices, performance, and commercial terms of
its broadband Internet access services, in a manner tailored (i) for end
users to make informed choices regarding use of such services, (ii) for
edge providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings, and
(iii) for the Commission and members of the public to understand how
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such person complies with the requirements described in sections 8.5 and
8.7 of this chapter.
(b) In making the disclosures required by this section, a person engaged
in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall include
meaningful information regarding the source, timing, speed, packet loss,
and duration of congestion.
(c) In making the disclosures required by this section, a person engaged
in the provision of broadband Internet access service shall publicly
disclose in a timely manner to end users, edge providers, and the
Commission when they make changes to their network practices as well
as any instances of blocking, throttling, and pay-for-priority
arrangements, or the parameters of default or "best effort" service as
distinct from any priority service.
§ 8.5 No Blocking.
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to
reasonable
network
management.
A person engaged in the provision of mobile broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block consumers
from accessing lawful websites, subject to reasonable network
management; nor shall such person block applications that compete with
the provider's voice or video telephony services, subject to reasonable
network management.
§ 8.7 No Commercially Unreasonable Practices.
A person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in
commercially unreasonable practices. Reasonable network management
shall not constitute a commercially unreasonable practice.
§ 8.9 Other Laws and Considerations.
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Nothing in this part supersedes any obligation or authorization a provider
of broadband Internet access service may have to address the needs of
emergency communications or law enforcement, public safety, or
national security authorities, consistent with or as permitted by
applicable law, or limits the provider's ability to do so.
Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of
broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or
other unlawful activity.
§ 8.11 Definitions.
(a) Block. The failure of a broadband Internet access service to provide
an edge provider with a minimum level of access that is sufficiently
robust, fast, and dynamic for effective use by end users and edge
providers.
(b) Broadband Internet access service. A mass-market retail service by
wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit data to and receive
data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including any
capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service.
This term also encompasses any service that the Commission finds to be
providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous
sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in this Part.
(c) Edge Provider. Any individual or entity that provides any content,
application, or service over the Internet, and any individual or entity that
provides a device used for accessing any content, application, or service
over the Internet.
(d) End User. Any individual or entity that uses a broadband Internet
access service.
(e) Fixed broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet
access service that serves end users primarily at fixed endpoints using
stationary equipment. Fixed broadband Internet access service includes
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fixed wireless services (including fixed unlicensed wireless services),
and fixed satellite services.
(f) Mobile broadband Internet access service. A broadband Internet
access service that serves end users primarily using mobile stations.
(g) Reasonable network management. A network management practice
is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate
network management purpose, taking into account the particular network
architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service.

